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Regulation of Uninsured Multiple-Employer 
Trusts Under ERISA: An Open Question Again? 
The term "uninsured multiple-employer trusts" (MET's) 
describes a large and complex field of entities that are established \ 
to offer employee benefits to employees of small employers. By 
banding together, these small employers generally pool their re- 
sourcbs to provide more economical benefits, and in some cases, 
they purchase partial insurance coverage from insurance carriers 
at  the lower rates given large employers. These uninsured1 MET 
arrangements are typically organized and managed by third- 
party administrators who may be either independent entrepre- 
neurs or insurance company representatives. Uninsured MET's 
assume a wide variety of legal forms including  trust^,^ unincor- 
porated  association^,^ and administrative service  corporation^.^ 
Collectively bargained multiemployer plans are not considered 
part of the uninsured MET field discussed here.VI'he benefits 
provided through uninsured MET's are usually paid directly from 
trust assets derived from employers' and employees' contribu- 
tions. 
Following the enactment of the Employee Retirement In- 
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),Qontroversy and alarm7 grew 
1. The term "uninsured" adds an important distinction to the class of entities under 
discussion. Insured multiple-employer trusts pay their benefit obligations through duly 
licensed insurance carriers. The financial stability, marketing practices, investment poli- 
cies, and claims payment procedures of the insurance carriers in turn are regulated by 
state insurance laws. Although in some cases uninsured MET's purchase limited insur- 
ance coverage, the benefits provided by uninsured MET's are predominantly self-funded. 
See Brummond, The Legal Status of Uninsured Noncollectively-Bargained Multiple- 
Employer Welfare Trusts Under ERISA and State Insurance Laws, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
701 (1977). 
2. See Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977). 
3. See Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977). 
4. See Brummond, supra note 1, a t  701. 
5. The "multiemployer" trusts or plans which are formed between a labor union and 
more than one employer pursuant to the provisions of a collective bargaining argreement 
are defined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 $3(37), 29 U.S.C. $ 
1002(37) (1976). 
6. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified a t  29 U.S.C. $ 5  1001-1381 (1976)) (also 
codified in scattered sections of 18, 19, 26 U.S.C.). 
7. See David, Employee Benefit Trusts' Growth Alarms Officials; More Failures 
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as a rapidly expanding number of uninsured MET's claimed ex- 
emption from state insurance laws because of the preemption 
provisions of ERISA.These uninsured MET's were, for the most 
part, viewed by state insurance officials as purely entrepreneurial 
venturesqg deliberately structured to fall within the so-called 
"regulatory void" beyond the jurisdiction of state insurance de- 
partments. Furthermore, the plan organizers assumed that 
ERISA's preemption provisions left the uninsured MET's appar- 
ently free from substantial federal regulation since ERISA's vest- 
ing and funding requirements do not apply to employee welfare 
benefit plans. '"The immediate question was whether state insur- 
ance officials could regulate the uninsured MET's, and if they 
could, to what extent. The urgency of the question was height- 
ened by the insolvency of two large uninsured MET's. Addition- 
ally, several million citizens were believed to be enrolled in other 
MET programs for which there was no effective regulation.I1 Con- 
-- - 
Feared (pts. 1, 2), Bus. INS., Feb. 21, 1977, a t  1, Mar. 7, 1977, a t  1. A series of articles 
and editorials covering the uninsured multiple-employer trust question and related court 
cases appeared in Business Insurance between Feb. 21, 1977 and Jan. 23, 1978. See also 
H.R. REP. NO.  1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 94- 
17851. In a more recent update regarding the increasing magnitude of the uninsured MET 
problem, Herbert W. Anderson, Chairman, National Association of Insurance Commis- 
sioners (NAIC) ERISA Preemption Task Force, reported to the House Subcommittee on 
Labor Standards that the NAIC conservatively estimates that more than 600,000 employ- 
ees and their beneficiaries are enrolled under "employee welfare benefit plans" of unin- 
sured MET's. Anderson noted that other estimates range as high as three million people. 
Furthermore, approximately $300 million in contributions are collected annually by pro- 
moters of uninsured MET's. At least 30 MET's or affiliated organizations were knoun to 
be operating in mid-1978. Oversight on ERISA, 1978: Hearings on Public Law 93-406 
Before the Subconm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 650 (statement of National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
by Herbert W. Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force) [hereinafter 
cited as ERISA Oversight ?learings]. 
8. ERISA supersedes any and all state laws relating to employee benefit plans. 
ERISA 514, 29 U.S.C. 4 1144 (1976). See text accompanying notes 20-28 infra. 
9. The choice of language used here, which may have certain pejorative connotations, 
is not intended to imply that those individuals who administer or represent uninsured 
MET'S are necessarily unscrupulous; rather, the assertion is that the business and legal 
structures provide incentive for conduct injurious to the working public. 
lo. ERISA $4  201(1), 301(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. §§  1051(1), 1081(a)(l) (1976). Employee 
welfare benefit plans need only comply with ERISA's reporting and disclosure provisions 
and abide by the Act's fiduciary standards. Employee pension benefit plans, however, are 
subject to all of ERISA's provisions. 
11. On Feb. 2, 1977, the National Multiple Employers' Foundation, a California- 
based MET, filed a petition in bankruptcy. Approximately two months later, a second 
California-based MET, the Hospital Welfare Association Trust, filed an action seeking the 
appointment of a federal receiver because of its insolvent position. See David, Employee 
Benefit Trusts' Growth Alarms Officials; More Failures Feared (pt. I), Bus. INS., Feb. 21, 
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sequently, state insurance departments mobilized their re- 
sources, went to the courts, and won important victoriesI2 involv- 
ing uninsured MET's that were purportedly, but not in fact, es- 
tablished or maintained by employee organizations.13 These 
bogus em ployee-organization MET's, however, comprise only a 
segment of the much larger field of uninsured MET's. 
The apparent judicial consensus permitting state insurance 
departments to regulate bogus employee-organization MET's did 
not resolve the jurisdictional question for all uninsured MET's. 
Although the Labor Department" favors state control of bogus 
employee-organization MET's, it has been reluctant to relinquish 
jurisdiction over other portions of the uninsured MET field. 'The 
Labor Department's position has prompted some uninsured 
MET's to restructure their operations to conform with the judi- 
cial decisions to date.'" 
Another reason for the uncertainty regarding the regulation 
of uninsured MET's is that, until recently, no court had ruled 
whether an employee benefit plan allegedly established or main- 
tained by an association of employers was a valid ERISA-covered 
plan. However, in January 1979 a federal district court in Califor- 
nia determined that an uninsured MET established and main- 
tained by an employer association was a valid ERISA-covered 
employee benefit plan." Interestingly, in spite of the federal 
1977, a t  1; David, Court Case Could Set Self-funded Trust Rules, Bus. INS., Apr. 18, 1977, 
a t  1. I t  is also estimated that three million people are presently receiving welfare benefits 
from uninsured MET's. Between Jan. 1977 and June 1978 five major uninsured MET's 
went insolvent. The unpaid claims of just two of those insolvent MET's were estimated 
a t  in excess of $7.5 million. See ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, a t  659 (state- 
ment of NAIC by Herbert W. Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task 
Force). 
12. See Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977); 
Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977). 
13. An employee organization MET refers to an employee benefit plan established 
or maintained by an employee organjzation as defined in ERISA 9 3(4), 29 U.S.C. (j 
1002(4) (1976). See text accompanying note 42 infra. 
14. Although the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury jointly admin- 
ister ERISA according to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. $ 9  1201-1204 (1976), direct supervi- 
sion of uninsured MET'S originates from the Administrator of Pension and Welfare Bene- 
fit Programs a t  the Labor Department. 
15. Letter from James D. Hutchinson, Labor Department Administrator, to Willie 
R. Barnes. California Commissioner of Corporations (Jul. 4, 1976), reprinted in 119761 
PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 96, a t  R-1 (Jul. 26, 1976). 
16. David, Trusts Retrench in Wake of Court Decisions, Bus. INS., Oct. 17, 1977, a t  
1. 
17. Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Security Health Plan, No. 78-1926 RMT 
(GX) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1979). 
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court determination, the Labor Department has nonetheless 
taken the position that the plan in question is not a legitimate 
ERISA plan. lx 
This recent turn of events intensifies the uncertainty sur- 
rounding the jurisdictional issue of uninsured MET's. The ques- 
tion persists whether state insurance officials can regulate unin- 
sured MET's, and if so, to what extent. 
This Comment focuses on past and present judicial, legisla- 
tive, and regulatory efforts to define the respective roles of the 
state and federal governments in regulating uninsured MET's. 
First, a brief over vie^'^ summarizing ERISA's preemption provi- 
sions and the two conflicting interpretations of those provisions 
will be presented. The focus will then shift to an analysis of court 
decisions in the uninsured MET field that have attempted to 
define employee benefit plans. Subsequently, the central import- 
ance of the substantive/defihitional conflict in defining an em- 
ployee benefit plan will be considered. Finally, alternatives will 
be presented for resolving the uninsured MET regulatory contro- 
versy. 
11. ERISA's PREEMPTION PROVISIONS 
AND CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS 
Section 514 of ERISA expressly declares Congress' intent to 
occupy the field of employee benefit plans.20 The general preemp- 
tive language of section 514(a), the "relation clause," states in 
broad terms that ERISA "shall supersede any and all state laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee bene- 
fit plan."21 
18. Letter from Ian D. Lanoff, Labor Department Adminstrator, to Thomas J .  
Wilkie, Administrator of Insurance and Prepaid Benefits Trust (Jul. 23, 1979), reprinted 
in 119791 P E N S .  REP. (BNA) No. 250, a t  R-26 (Jul. 30, 1979). 
19. FOP a more detailed analysis of the larger question of ERISA's preemption of state 
laws generally, see Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 23 (1978); Turza & 
Halloway. Preemption of State Laws IJnder the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 163 (1979). For a discussion of ERISA preemption of state 
insurance regulation. see Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation 
[Tnder ERISA. 62 IOWA L. REV. 57 (1976); Okin, Preemption of State Insurance Regulation 
by ERISA, 13 FORUM 652 (1978). 
20. ERISA's preemption provisions are codified a t  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)-(d) (1976). 
21. ERISA 5 Fil4(a), 29 U.S.C. 1144(a) (1976). The term "state law" as used in the 
preemption provisions includes "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other state ac- 
tion having the effect of law, of any state." Id. 9 514(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. 5 1144(c)(l). Moreo- 
ver, the term "state" is defined to include "a state, any political subdivision thereof, or 
any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, 
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The "savings clause," section 5l4(b) (Z)(A), reserves or saves 
the states' regulatory power over insurance matters by clarifying 
that "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or 
relieve any person from any law of any state which regulates 
insurance, banking, or se~ur i t i e s . "~~  Congress, in an apparent at- 
tempt to reinforce the broad preemptive language of the relation 
clause and simultaneously circumscribe the scope of the savings 
clause,23 included section 5l4(b) (2) (B) , the "deemer clause." The 
deemer clause provides in relevant part: "Neither an employee 
benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan, 
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, 
bank, trust company, or investment company . . . ."" The ex- 
tent to which the deemer clause qualifies the savings clause has 
been the focal point of much of the preemption-related litiga- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Finally, section 514(d) states that ERISA shall neither 
supplant nor impinge upon other existing federal laws? In the 
the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans . . . ." Id. 8 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. 9 
1144(c)(2). 
22. Id. 8 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. 4 1144(b)(2)(A). 
23. Both the original House and Senate versions of ERISA provided for limited 
preemption of state law. A broader preemption provision was subsequently drafted and 
adopted in conference committee. Senator Jacob Javits explained the reasoning behind 
the change in these words: 
Both House and Senate bills provided for prtemption of s ta te  law, 
but-with one major exception appearing in the House Bill-defined the peri- 
meters of preemption in relation to  the areas regulated by the bill. Such a 
formulation raised the possibility of endless litigation over the validity of state 
action that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well as opening the door to 
multiple and potentially conflicting state laws hastily contrived to deal with 
some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not clearly 
connected to the Federal regulatory scheme. 
Although the desirability of further regulation-at either the state or Fed- 
eral level-undoubtedly warrants further attention, on balance, the emergence 
of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniform- 
ity with respect to interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-the 
displacement of state action in the field of private employee benefit programs. 
120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974). 
24. ERISA 5 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. 8 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976). 
25. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U S .  
980 (1978); Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977); 
Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 484 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977); Wayne Chem., Inc. v. 
Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd as modified, 567 F.2d 
692 (7th Cir. 1977); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd,  
571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 19771, cert. denied. 439 U.S. 831 (1978). 
26. ERISA 4 514(d), 29 U.S.C. 4 1144(d) (1976). The subsection states: "Nothing in 
this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or su- 
persede any law of the United States (except a s  provided in sections 1031 and 1137(b) of 
this title) or any rule or regulation issued under any such law." 
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insurance context, section 514(d) is frequently referred to as rec- 
ognizing the validity of the McCarran-Ferguson Act," which es- 
tablished the national policy of state primacy in insurance regula- 
tion .2s 
In the application of ERISA's preemption provisions to the 
vast array of entities allegedly operating as employee benefit 
plans, two conflicting interpretations of section 514 have 
emerged: a broad view and a narrow view of preemption. 
A.  Broad Interpretation of Preemption 
One of the strongest and most frequently cited judicial pro- 
nouncements in favor of total preemption is Hewlett-Packard Co. 
v. Barnes. 29 In Hew let t -  Packard the administrators of various 
ERISA health benefit plans challenged the authority of the defen- 
dant Commissioner of Corporations to regulate their programs 
under the California Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act 
of 197530 on the ground that the Act had been preempted by 
ERISA. The commissioner contended that neither the language 
of ERISA's preemption provisions nor the Act's legislative history 
mandated the preemption of state legislation, such as the Knox- 
Keene Act, that regulates health services. He further argued that 
because the Knox-Keene Act regulates the business of insurance, 
i t  was precluded from preemption by virtue of the savings 
clause? Following a careful analysis of section 514's plain lan- 
guage,:j2 and the statute's legislative history,:Vhe court sided with 
27. 15 U.S.C. (34 1011-1015 (1976). 
28. The McCarran-Ferguson Act further provides that "[nlo Act of Congress shall 
be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any state for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates 
to the business of insurance." Id. 
29. 4'25 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 831 (1978). 
30. Knox-Keene Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE $5 1340-1345 (West Cum. Supp. 
1971-1977). 
31. A third argument raised by the defendant commissioner was that if ERISA were 
to be construed so broadly as to preempt state regulation of health care services, then § 
514(a) would be violative of the tenth amendment of the Constitution. The court disposed 
of this argument by noting that other courts have repeatedly held that the tenth amend- 
ment does not limit Congress' application of the commerce power to private activity. 425 
F. Supp. at 1301. 
32. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the words "relate to" as con- 
tained in Q 514(a) of ERISA were "vague and ambiguous." On the contrary, the court 
concluded that Congress could not have "chosen any more precise language to express its 
intent to preempt a state statute such as Knox-Keene insofar as it seeks to regulate 
ERISA-covered employee benefit plans . . . ." Id. a t  1297. 
33. The district court judge relied primarily on statements from conference commit- 
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the plan administrators and ruled that the Knox-Keene Act was 
preempted to the extent that it applied to ERISA-covered em- 
ployee welfare benefit plans. The court stated: 
In seeking to regulate plaintiff's plans pursuant to Knox-Keene 
under the theory that the statute applies to and that such plans 
constitute "insurance," defendant contravenes the clear intent 
of Section 514(a) and (b) of ERISA that employee benefit plans, 
so dubbed or under any other name, be free of state reg~lation.:'~ 
Thus, the Hewlett-Packard preemption test requires that a state 
insurance statute be preempted whenever it relates to a valid 
ERISA employee benefit plan. 
R. Narrow interpretation of Preemption 
In contrast to the expansive approach taken by the court in 
Hewlett-Packard, the court in Wadsworth u. Whalandti5 adopted 
a narrow view of preemption. In Wadsworth representatives of 
several health and welfare funds objected to a New Hampshire 
lawM that required all insurers issuing group health insurance 
policies in the state to include coverage for mental illness and 
emotional disorders. Since ERISA does not impose a similar re- 
quirement and because the benefit plans involved were ERISA- 
covered, the plan representatives sought to enjoin the defendant 
Commissioner of Insurance from enforcing the requirement.'" The 
plaintiffs argued that to directly regulate group insurance policies 
by imposing mandatory coverages is to exercise indirect control 
over the benefits an employee receives from his employee welfare 
benefit plan. Hence, they contended that a state insurance stat- 
ute that indirectly relates to an ERISA employee benefit plan 
tee members as to the legislation's purpose. Congressman John Den.t, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Labor and Education Committee, was quoted as 
stating in part: 
Finally I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement 
of this legislation. the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to  regulate 
the field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round 
out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting 
and inconsistent state and local regulations. 
120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974). See also id. a t  29,933 (remarks of Senator Harrison Wil- 
liams, Jr.). 
34. 425 F. Supp. a t  1300. 
35. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978). 
36. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 4 415:18-a (Supp. 1977). 
37. Cf. Insurer's Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921, 956 (D. Minn. 
1976) (injunction denied because no clear conflict existed between challenged state insur- 
ance law and ERISA). 
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should trigger the preemption provision. The trial court dis- 
agreed. 
The First Circuit affirmed the lower court decision by con- 
cluding that the deemer clause did not forbid states from indi- 
rectly affecting employee benefit plans by regulating group insur- 
ance policies. The court reasoned that a contrary holding would 
completely emasculate the savings clause and contravene the 
express objective of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to uphold state 
primacy in the regulation of insurance. 
The Hewlett-Pachard court's decision that a state insurance 
law is preempted whenever it relates to a valid ERISA employee 
benefit plan naturally requires that the first determination be 
whether the plan in question is a valid ERISA-defined plan. In 
cases involving uninsured MET'S, the courts have concerned 
themselves primarily with ascertaining whether specific plans 
qualify as legitimate ERISA employee benefit plans. These courts 
have encountered complex definitional questions because of the 
complicating role played by third-party administrators or entre- 
preneurs who substantially minimize or eliminate the participa- 
tion of employers and employees in the operation of the plan. 
Employer or employee participation in the establishment or 
maintenance of a plan, however, is a prerequisite for qualification 
as an employee benefit plan. 
A. ERISA Definitions 
Specifically, ERISA defines an employee benefit plan as an 
employee welfare benefit plan, an employee pension benefit 
plan,:%r a plan that combines the two? An employee welfare 
benefit plan means "any plan, fund, or program . . . established 
or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, 
or by both . . . for the purpose of providing for its participants 
or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or 
otherrvise [any of a number of enumerated benefits 1 ."-"' Further- 
38. Employee pension benefit plans are beyond the scope of this Comment. They are 
defined in ERISA 0 3(2). 29 U.S.C. 4 1002(2) (1976). 
39. Id. 0 3 0 ) .  29 U.S.C. 0 1002(3). 
40. Id. j 3(1), 29 U.S.C. 4 1002(1) (emphasis added). The benefits specified by the 
statute include "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of 
sickness. accident. disabilitv, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprentice- 
ship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal 
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more, " It 1 he term 'employer' means any person acting directly 
as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of employer, in rela- 
tion to an employee benefit plan; and includes a group or associa- 
tion of employers acting for an employer in such ~apacity."~'  Fi- 
nally, regarding "employee organization," ERISA states: 
The term "employee organization" means any labor union 
or any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee 
representation committee, association, group, or plan, in which 
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole 
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning an employee 
benefit plan, or other matters incidental to employment rela- 
tionships; or any employees' beneficiary association organized 
for the purpose in whole or in part, of establishing such a p1an.l" 
B. Wayne Chemical-First Purported Plan 
Held Outside of ERISA S Scope 
One of the first courts to examine the ERISA definitions and 
conclude that an alleged ERISA plan was not a valid employee 
benefit plan was the Seventh Circuit in Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. 
Columbus Agenc.y Service Corp. J:' The suit was brought in behalf 
of a plan beneficiary who had become severely paralyzed in an 
accident when he was eighteen years old and still covered by a 
group medical insurance policy purchased by his father's em- 
ployer. Shortly before the mishap, the defendant service corpora- 
tion had formally transferred the policy from a conventional in- 
surance carrier to National Multiple Employers Foundation 
(NMEF), alleged to be a multiple-employer welfare trust. The 
quadriplegic son was later notified that, according to the terms 
of the NMEF policy, his benefits would end on his twentieth 
birthday, a result contrary to Indiana law." The district court 
found the NMEF plan to be a legitimate ERISA plan and ruled 
that  the state law that  would have permitted recovery was 
services . . . ." Id. 4 .3(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. 5 1002(1)(A). 
I t  should be noted that this Comment primarily focuses upon uninsured MET'S that  
provide benefits to their participants or beneficiaries through means other than insurance. 
41. Id. 4 3(5), 29 U.S.C. 4 1002(5). 
42. Id. 4 3(4), 29 U.S.C. 4 1002(4). 
43. 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977). 
44. IND. CODE 4 27-8-5-10(B)(4) (1976). This statute requires that any group hospital 
and medical policy which permits termination of coverage once a dependent reaches a 
given age must also provide that the coverage cannot be terminated "while the child is 
and continues to be both (a) incapable of self-sustaining employment by reason of mental 
retardation or physical handicap and (b) chiefly dependent upon the employee or member 
for support and maintenance." Id. 
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preempted; nevertheless, the court granted relief under its power 
to fashion federal common law.'" 
On interlocutory appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
lower court decision, but on different grounds. The court held 
that NMEF was not a valid ERISA plan because the employer, 
Wayne Chemical, had neither transacted business with any trust 
or plan4%or participated in any employee benefit plan.'? On the 
contrary, Wayne Chemical had only contracted with the defen- 
dant service corporation for the procurement of insurance. Conse- 
quently, NMEF, which had been selling insurance without a cer- 
tificate of authority, and the agent service corporation were held 
subject to Indiana law? 
The Seventh Circuit also stated that  the question of 
"employer" or "employee organization" establishment, mainte- 
nance, and participation requirements was apparently not ad- 
dressed in the reports and debates of ERISA? The court, there- 
fore, chose to forego any discussion of the legislative history. Iron- 
ically, the court then proceeded to base its opinion upon an unu- 
sual retroactive declaration of legislative intent contained in an 
activity report issued by the House Committee on Education and 
Labor."'The report notes that "certain entrepreneurs have under- 
taken to market insurance products to employers and employees 
a t  large, claiming these products to be ERISA-covered plans." 
The report continues: 
To the extent that such programs fail to meet the definition 
of an "employee benefit plan," state regulation of them is not 
preempted by section 514, even though such state action is 
45. The district court adopted the appropriate Indiana statute as federal common law 
based upon Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U . S .  934 
(1964) (state law may be resorted to and adopted as a federal rule of decision if compatible 
with national policy). 
46. The court found no indication from the record that any trust or plan had been 
created. Importantly, the communications from the defendant service corporation to the 
plaintiff/employer stated that Wayne Chemical was the former's policyholder. 567 F.2d 
at 694-99. 
47. The court reasoned that Wayne Chemical could not have been a participating 
employer even if a trust or plan had existed because Wayne Chemical neither knew of the 
existence of such a plan until long after the formal transfer of insurance carriers nor did 
Wayne Chemical enter into an agreement to establish a plan. Id. a t  699. 
48. See IND. CODE 5 27-4-5-2(c)(2) (1976). Indiana's unauthorized insurer's act pro- 
vides that if anv unauthorized insurer defaults on an insurance contract governed by 
Indiana law, then anv person who assisted in the procurement of the insurance is person- 
ally liable on the coverage. 
49. 567 F.2d at 699 n.11. 
50. H.R. REP. 94-1 785. . w p m  note 7, a t  33. 
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barred with respect to the plans which purchase these 
"products." 
. . . .  
We are mindful of the potentially harmful effects of an 
overly broad interpretation of the term employee benefit plan 
when coupled with the policy of section 514. As we have already 
noted, we do not believe that the statute and legislative history 
will support the inclusion of what amounts to commercial prod- 
ucts within the umbrella of the definition. Where a plan is, in 
effect, an entrepreneurial venture, it is outside the policy of 
section 514 for reasons we have already stated. In short, to be 
properly characterized as an ERISA employee benefit plan, a 
plan must satisfy the definitional requirement of section 3(3) in 
both form and substance . . . . 51 
In view of the similarity of the wording in the activity report to 
the fact situation in Wa-yne Chemical, the court found it unneces- 
sary to more rigorously analyze "employer" or "employee organi- 
zation" establishment, maintenance, and participation require- 
ments. 
C. Hamberlin-Circumstances Dictate Result 
In Hamberlin v. VIP Insurance Trust," the United States 
District Court in Arizona was presented with a fact situation that 
it considered to be so clearly repugnant to ERISA's purposes that  
it offered only a conclusory analysis with supporting quotes from 
the activity report to support its holding. The beneficiaries of a 
group health and accident policy brought suit against the defen- 
dant insurance trust and defendant trustees for alleged violations 
of ERISA. Although the parties agreed that the defendant insur- 
ance trust was a valid ERISA plan, the defendants moved for 
dismissal on the ground that the alleged violations involved a 
simple contract action that  should properly be tried in state 
court. The State Insurance Commissioner filed an amicus brief 
arguing that control had not been preempted because the defen- 
dant trust did not qualify as an ERISA-covered employee benefit 
plan. Hence, the threshold and dispositive question was whether 
the federal court possessed subject matter jurisdiction in the case. 
The court concluded that it did not. 
In reaching its decision, the court placed considerable weight 
51. Id. at 48, quoted in Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 
at 699, 700. 
52. 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977). 
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on the apparent motives of the plan organizers and also on the 
circumstances surrounding the formation of the VIP Insurance 
Trust." Although the trust organizers sought the endorsement of 
various unrelated employers and groups, they marketed the poli- 
cies directly to individual employees who financed their own poli- 
cies. The employers played no meaningful role in the creation or 
maintenance of the trust. The court characterized the plan as an 
entrepreneurial scheme put together to protect business commis- 
sions, maintain business relations, and escape state insurance 
department supervision and auditing.5J The court observed: 
"[The defendant trustees] were simply not acting as agents of 
or on behalf of the employers or employer groups as contemplated 
by 29 U.S.C. $ 1002(5). They were acting in the interest of and 
on behalf of the business of Galbraith & Green, their e m p l ~ y e r . " ~ ~  
Moreover, the court perceived the conduct of the VIP trustees as 
deliberate self-dealing, which i t  would not countenance. There- 
fore, in much the same manner as the Wayne Chemical court, the 
Hamberlin court anchored its conclusion upon the language of 
the activity report that suggests that entrepreneurial ventures are 
outside the scope of ERISA.56 
D. Bell- Emergence of Judicial Criteria 
In a third case, Bell v. Employee Security Benefit 
Association," an unusual factual setting again arguably man- 
dated the court's conclusion. For instance, the defendant unin- 
sured MET was consuming seventy-two percent of each dollar 
collected for payment of commissions and administrative expen- 
s e ~ . ~ ~  Furthermore, the defendant never presented a defense, 
thereby allowing a default judgment to be entered." In other 
53. The original VIP Trust was a MET insured by Old Republic Life Insurance Co.. 
After Old Republic cancelled VIP Trust's group coverage, the insurance brokers estab- 
lished a new self-funded trust with itself acting as administrator for a 15% commission 
rather than replacing Old Republic with an authorized insurer. The court found that the 
trustees of the newly formed VIP Trust, while acting in that capacity, negotiated with 
themselves as corporate officers of the insurance brokerage an administration and man- 
agement agreement. The trustees, the court concluded, were acting solely in the interest 
of the insurance brokerage. Id. a t  1198. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 1199 (quoting H.R. REP. 94-1785, supra note 7, at48). See text accompany- 
ing not.e 51 supra. 
57. 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977). 
58. Id. at 384-85. See also note 61 and accompanying text infra. 
59. Because Emplovee Security Benefit Association (ESBA) was doing a minimal 
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words, in light of the unique fact situation in Bell, the court had 
no reasonable alternative but to conclude <that the defendant 
MET was not a valid employee benefit plan. The defendant Em- 
ployee Security Benefit Association (ESBA), an unincorporated 
association, was soliciting agents in numerous states, including 
Kansas, to offer its medical and death benefits plan, which it 
advertised as a "self-funded, self-adjusting Employee Benefit 
Plan established under Public Law 93-406."" Upon learning that 
ESBA was paying excessive commission rates to its marketing 
representatives, disbursing substantial plan funds for adminis- 
trative expenses," and enrolling as plan members individuals 
from a wide spectrum of unrelated occupations," the plaintiff 
insurance commissioner commenced suit to enjoin ESBA's busi- 
ness activities until it conformed to the state's various insurance 
statutes and regulations. Unlike the superficial analyses applied 
by the Wayne Chemical and Hamberlin courts, the Bell court set 
forth a two-pronged analytical approach to, first, determine the 
scope of the preemption provisions and, second, ascertain 
whether ESBA's program was "insurance" or an "employee bene- 
fit plan .'63 
After a review of the language in section 514 and its legisla- 
tive history, the court subscribed to the expansive view of 
preemption announced by the Hewlett-Packard court. Concern- 
ing the more difficult question whether ESBA's program was 
"insurance" or an "employee benefit plan," the court began its 
analysis by acknowledging that  most employee benefit plans 
comply with the criteria of a general definition of insuranceY The 
amount of business in Kansas as compared with other states, ESBA's counsel decided to 
default in Bell and focus full attention to litigation involving ESBA in Nevada. Letter 
from Curtis Lee Brooke, Counsel for ESBA, to the author (Oct. 3, 1979). 
60. 437 F. Supp. a t  384. 
61. D.M.A., Inc., an agency organized by two of ESBA's officers to market ESBA's 
program. received 50% of first year member contributions and 17 %% on renewal contribu- 
tions. Benefit Services Corp., a corporation organized by individuals with substantial ties 
to ESBA's organizers, provided administrative services to ESBA in exchange for a 22% 
commission on all contributions received. Id. at  384-85. 
62. A sampling of ESBA's members in Kansas included a contractor, a self-employed 
carpenter, a teacher's aide, a self-employed truck driver, and a sewer department em- 
ployee. Id. at  385. 
63. Id. 
64. The court referred to the conclusion of one author who proposed that a general 
description of insurance would ensure the following: (a) consideration (premium), (b) 
fortuitous event. (c) a group of people with identical interests more or less equally exposed 
to the same risks, (d) a shifting of that risk to the insurer, and (e) a distribution of the 
risk to others similarly exposed. Id. at  389. 
926 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
court then succinctly inquired: "Given that most employee bene- 
fit plans meet standard definitions of insurance, and that Con- 
gress meant to preempt state regulation of employee benefit plans 
without otherwise affecting state regulation of insurance, how are 
we to tell exactly what Congress meant to preempt?7765 
Several factors led the court to the conclusion that just as a 
state cannot regulate an employee benefit plan by calling it insur- 
ance, neither could ESBA merchandise an insurance program 
simply by terming it an employee benefit plan." The two princi- 
pal factors shaping the court's decision were the program's sub- 
stantive nature and the program's technical nonconformity with 
the ERISA definition of an employee benefit plan. First, from a 
substantive standpoint, the court surveyed pre-ERISA literature 
and determined that the "pre-ERISA concept of an 'employee 
benefit plan' was easily distinguished from the concept of 
6. 
~nsurance." '~~ Moreover, employee benefit plans before 1974 were 
considered to be nonprofit, nonadvertising programs provided by 
already existing employee groups rather than by employers." The 
court then identified five general standards typifying the em- 
ployee benefit plan concept as it existed when Congress adopted 
ERISA's preemption  provision^.^^ Based upon those standards, 
the court determined that it was "clear" that ESBA's program 
was not an employee benefit plan but was instead "disguised 
insurance ."7" 
After examining the specific wording of the ERISA provi- 
sions, the Bell court also concluded that ESBA's program did not 
qualify as an employee benefit plan as that term is defined in 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 390. 
67. One pre-ERISA article listed the following characteristics as distinguishing em- 
ployee benefit plans from insurance: (1) funds not open to the public, (2) no advertising 
or solicitation. (3) voluntary membership, and (4) a non-profit operation. Id..See 28 ARK. 
L. REV. 515, 516 (1975). 
68. 437 F. Supp. at 390. 
69. The court stated: 
Clearly, the [employer benefit plan1 concept as it existed when Congress 
passed the preemption provisions of ERISA involved the following characteris- 
tics: (1) it was provided by an employer or homogeneous employee organization, 
such as a union; (b) it was non-commercial in nature; (c) it did not involve 
solicitation; (d) it was not intended to be actuarially sound; (e) because the 
employees could look only to the fund, and not to the provider of that fund, the 
rates were substantially lower than insurance rates. 
Id. at 391. 
70. Id. at 392. 
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section 3(3) of ERISA.?' Although ESBA's program indisputably 
qualified under the medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits 
provision,72 the court found that the program failed to qualify as 
having been established or maintained by either an employeri" or 
an employee organization." In finding that ESBA's program was 
neither established nor maintained by an employee organization, 
the court relied primarily on reasoning supplied by the Labor 
Department in its amicus brief.75 
IV. SHAPING THE SUBSTANTIVE/DEFINITIONAL CONFLICT 
The holding in Bell that ESBA was not a valid ERISA em- 
ployee benefit plan was based on dual lines of analysis- 
substantive and definitional. Fortunately, both lines of analysis 
when applied to that particular fact setting compelled the same 
conclusion. In other words, the substantive analysis in Bell led to 
the conclusion that ESBA was doing the business of insurance. 
71. 29 U.S.C. $ 1002(3) (1976). 
72. See note 40 and accompanying text supra. 
73. See note 41 and accompanying text supra. The court summarily concluded that 
ESBA was not established or maintained by employers since ESBA did not employ those 
persons who purchased its benefits coverage. In addition, ESBA did not act directly or 
indirectly for the benefit of employers who hired ESBA plan members. 437 F. Supp. a t  
393. 
74. See note 42 and accompanying text supra. The court had some difficulty in 
determining that the ESBA plan was not established or maintained by an employee 
organization because of the circular definition in 4 3(4) of ERISA. Specifically, the term 
"employee organization" is defined in terms of the plan provided. The term "plan" is 
defined in terms of who provides it. Because of the ruling in Stamps v. Michigan Teams- 
ters Joint Council No. 43,431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977), which states that no statute 
may be construed in a manner so as to render a portion superfluous, the court felt con- 
strained to define the term "employees' beneficiary association." Based upon an examina- 
tion of legislation preceding ERISA and portions of the Internal Revenue Code, the court 
identified the "commonality of interest" element as being a necessary requisite for an 
employees' benefit association. Since ESBA enrolled virtually anyone in its program who 
was employed, the court found no commonality of interest in ESBA's program. 437 F. 
Supp. a t  393-96. 
75. Memorandum of Secretary of Labor, Amicus Curiae, Bell v. Employee Security 
Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977), reprinted in 119771 PENS. REP. (BNA) 
No. 150, a t  R-1 (Aug. 15, 1977). Because ESBA did not claim to be an employer, employer 
association, or labor union, the Labor Department's brief examined whether ESBA quali- 
fied as an employee organization. The Department first argued that ESBA was not an 
employee representation committee or similar organization in which employees partici- 
pate and which deals with employers. Second, the Department contended that ESBA was 
not an employee beneficiary association because the program's members lacked any kind 
of employment "commonality of interest." The commonality requirement was adopted 
because of its use in similarly worded sections of ERISA's predecessor, the Welfare and 
Pension Plans Disclosure Act. See Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 
85-836. Ej 3. 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed 1976). 
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The definitional analysis also precluded ESBA's classification as 
an  employee benefit plan because ESBA did not comply 
with ERISA's definitions of employer or employee organization. 
Perhaps because the circumstances of the case did not require a 
more detailed analysis, the Bell court failed to consider that fact 
settings may arise in which the two lines of analysis would lead 
to opposite results. For example, based on the Bell opinion, a t  
least. two types of cases would merit further inspection by the 
court: (1) an uninsured MET established or maintained by a 
definitionally conforming employee organization or (2) an unin- 
sured MET established or maintained by an association of em- 
ployers. Either type of case, if accompanied by the appropriate 
fact setting, would pose the classic conflict: a valid employee 
benefit plan (measured by definitional standards) that is trans- 
acting insurance business (measured by substantive standards). 
Such a case would create a direct conflict between the McCarran- 
Ferguson Act mandate that the business of insurance be regu- 
lated by the states and ERISA's broad preemption provisions 
that exclusively reserve to the federal government supervision 
over all employee benefit plans. In none of the cases considered 
thus far did the fact situations pose such a conflict; rather, those 
cases involved transparent attempts to circumvent state insur- 
ance laws for the sole purpose of furthering individuals' self- 
interest a t  the expense of the public. 
The recent case of Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. 
Security Health Plan (IPBT (I)),'%ith its pending sequel (ZPBT 
(11)),77 presents a fact setting in which the substantive/ 
definitional conflict is clear and inescapable. In IPBT (I) the 
plaintiff trust sued the defendant health-care provider and others 
in a contract d i s p ~ t e . ~ T h e  d fendants moved to have the action 
dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff trust was not a valid 
ERISA employee benefit plan. Relying primarily upon 
Hamberlin and Bell, the defendants attempted to characterize 
Insurance and Prepaid Benefits Trust's (IPBT) origin and mode 
of operation as essentially the same as those prior plans, which 
were declared invalid employee benefit plans. The defendants 
76. No. 78-1926 RMT (GX) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1979). 
77. Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Marshall, No. CV 7903029 RMT (PX) 
(C.D. Cal.. filed Aug. 9. 1979). 
78. The plaintiff trust alleged that the defendants violated their fiduciary duties by 
mishandling funds. Contrarv to the provisions of the agreement entered into by the two 
parties, the defendants allegedly wrongfully appropriated plan funds for their own pur- 
poses rather than providing benefits to the plan's participants and beneficiaries. 
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also argued, adopting precisely the same substantive analysis 
used by the Bell court, that IPBT complied with no more than 
one of the five general standards that typified the employee bene- 
fit plan concept as it existed when Congress adopted ERISA.i8 
Moreover, the defendants alleged that: (1) the IPBT plan was 
entirely commercial in nature, (2) IPBT "products" were mar- 
keted directly to the public in the same manner that insurance 
is solicited, (3) the IPBT plan was intended to be actuarially 
sound," and (4) IPBT's coverage rates were lower than insurance 
rates. The fifth criterion that the plan be provided by an em- 
ployer or homogeneous employee organization was concededly a 
debatable issue 
The plaintiff trust successfully countered the defendants' al- 
legations and reasoning, that is its substantive analysis, by argu- 
ing that IPBT was "an employee benefit plan as defined under 
ERISA."" The IPBT counsel explained that in December 1977 
the single trust (IPBT) was divided into five successor trusts 
under the control of a benefit committee that was empowered to 
organize and manage the trusts? Each trust is allegedly an or- 
ganization of employers within a specific industry. Participating 
employers are chosen from the ranks of the five individual trusts 
to serve as members of the benefit c ~ m m i t t e e . ~ ~  Thus, the plain- 
tiff trust contended that it complied with the definition of an 
employee benefit plan formed by an association of emp10yers.~~ 
Having reviewed the extensive memoranda of points and 
79. See note 69 and accompanying text supra. 
80. The absurd implication here is that actuarial soundness is not desirable for em- 
ployee benefit plans. Although it may be true that insurance carriers are required to 
remain actuarially sound and that employee benefit plans are not, the Bell court c o ~ l d  
not reasonably have meant that an employee benefit plan's intention to be actuarially 
sound could defeat its ERISA status. 
81. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities a t  17-20, Insurance & Pre- 
paid Benefits Trust v. Security Health Plan, No. 78-1926 RMT (GX) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 
1979). 
82. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities a t  4, Insurance & Prepaid 
Benefits Trust v. Security Health Plan, No. 78-1926 RMT (GX) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1979) 
(emphasis added). 
83. Id. a t  6. 
84. Complaint for Plaintiff a t  2, Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Marshall, No. 
CV 7903029 RMT (PX) (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 9, 1979). 
85. According to the trust agreements under which IPBT is organized, the governing 
board or "benefit committee" is comprised of participating employers in the trust. The 
benefit committee is authorized and empowered to adopt benefit plans, set rates, establish 
rules for participation, and contract for services with outside organizations. Benefit com- 
mittee members may be removed by the vote of a majority of the participating employers. 
Id. at  7-8. 
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authorities from both sides, the court ruled that IPBT was an 
employee benefit plan under section 3(3) of ERISAXhnd there- 
fore subject to the provisions of ERISA. Although the court chose 
to rule from the bench and not to write an opinion, it did adopt 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.x7 It is unfortunate that the 
court did not prepare an opinion explaining its holding since 
IPBT (I) is the first case of an  adjudication of an employer asso- 
ciation uninsured METY 
To further add to the uncertainty created by IPBT (I), the 
Labor Department in July of 1979-six months after IPBT 
(I)-sent the administrator of IPBT an advisory opinion. The 
opinion stated that in spite of the holding in IPBT (I), the De- 
partment did not consider IPBT to be a valid ERISA-covered 
employee benefit plan.Rg IPBT filed an action on August 9, 1979, 
against the Secretary of Labor seeking declaratory relief and a 
court mandate ordering the Labor Department to recognize IPBT 
under ERISA. 
In its advisory opinion, the Labor Department states that a 
multiple-employer plan exists where a "cognizable" group or as- 
sociation of employers establishes a benefit program for their 
employees, where the employees jointly establish a program with 
an employee organization, or where the employers subscribe to a 
plan established by an employee assoc ia t i~n .~~~  According to the 
86. 29 U.S.C. $ 1002(3) (1976). 
87. Settlement negotiations between the two parties commenced before the court's 
decree was entered. Although the plaintiff trust was apparently willing to settle when i t  
became apprised of the defendant health-care provider's unstable financial condition, 
both parties submitted complete memoranda of points and authorities and requested that 
the judge rule on the trust's ERISA status. Only after the court's decision on that issue 
was announced did the parties present the court with a consent judgment for its approval. 
Telephone int.erview with Claude J .  Dorias, Counsel for Insurance and Prepaid Benefits 
Trust (Aug. 16. 1979). 
88. Although IPBT ( I )  was the first judicially resolved uninsured MET case involving 
an "emplover associat,ion," a t  least two other cases were settled out of court. The case of 
California v. Aid Fringe Benefits Group Trust, No. C 77-2296 AJZ (N.D. Cal. 1979), was 
removed to federal court. where a stipulated final judgment and permanent injunction 
were entered. California v. 3/33 Group Benefit Trust, No. 243.15B (San Francisco, Cal. 
Super. Ct,, filed Sept. 6, 1977), was brought in state court before being settled. 
89. Letter from Ian D. Lanoff, Labor Department Administrator, to Thomas J .  
Wilkie, Insurance and Prepaid Benefits Trust Administrator (July 23, 1979), reprinted in 
119791 PENS.  REP. (BNA) No. 250, at  R-26 (Jul. 30, 1979). 
90. The last paragraph of the Department's advisory opinion states: 
It is the Department of Labor's view, based on the definitional provisions 
of ERISA as well as the overall statutory scheme, that a multiple employer plan 
exists where a cognizable group or association of employers establishes a benefit 
program for the emplovees of member employers, or where several employers 
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Department, each of the  above situations involves an  
"organizational relationship" among the employers, employees, 
or both. This reasoning is rooted in the "commonality of interest" 
argument presented by the Department in Bell,s1 an argument 
that the Bell court had some difficulty in adopting.g2 It is trou- 
bling that the Department now reasons that when several unre- 
lated employers execute identical trust agreements with an inde- 
pendent third party as a means of funding welfare benefits and 
there is no "concerted 'sponsor' or 'settlor' activity," the resulting 
trust is not an employee benefit plan under ERISA. The flaw in 
the Department's reasoning arises because of its failure to con- 
sider the conjunction "or" in ERISA's definition of an employee 
benefit plan as any plan, fund, or program "established or main- 
tained by an employer or by an employee organizati~n."~:~ I t  may 
be argued that when an independent third party seeks out and 
brings together employers from unrelated areas to "establish" a 
multiple-employer plan, the formation process is initiated and 
directed by the third party rather than by the employers them- 
selves. Accordingly, the arrangement supposedly does not qualify 
as an ERISA plan under the "established" language. However, 
the disjunctive language, "or maintained by," provides another 
avenue whereby a third-party administrator scheme may qualify 
as a valid ERISA plan. The statutory language does not appear 
and one or more employee organizations jointly establish such a program, or 
where several employers contribute to a plan established by an employee organi- 
zation. In each of these contexts there is some organizational relationship among 
the employers, or the employees, or both in coming together and establishing a 
single plan. But where several unrelated employers, in establishing benefit pro- 
grams for their unrelated employees, without any concerted "sponsor" or 
"settlor" activity, merely execute identically worded "trust agreements," 
"subscription agreements," or similar documents offered by an independent 
third party as a means to fund benefits, no multiple employer plan can be 
recognized. In such a situation, each employer (or each bona fide employer 
association) establishes its own plan, and the entity contracted with to provide 
benefits is not itself an employee benefit plan, but the provider of a funding 
vehicle to the various plans. We believe that this description fits IBT. Accord- 
ingly, we have determined that IBT, as an entity, is not a multiple employer 
plan subject to ERISA. This, of course, does not mean that individual employers 
or bona fide employer associations which have associated themselves with IBT 
have not established individual employee welfare benefit plans subject to the 
coverage of ERISA or that persons who act in fiduciary capacities with respect 
to those plans are not subject to the fiduciary obligations imposed by part 4 of 
Title 1 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 6 1101 et seq. 
Id. 
91. See note 75 supra. 
92. See note 74 and accompanying text supra. 
93. ERISA 6 3(1), 29 U.S.C. 6 1002(1) (1976) (emphasis added). 
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to prohibit an independent third party from organizing the MET 
by deliberately aligning the unrelated employers' interests such 
t h a t  the  employers thereafter "maintain" the plan as a 
"cognizable" group adhering to a definite "organizational rela- 
tionship." It would seem improper, therefore, for the Department 
to focus on the "established" language of the ERISA definition 
to the complete exclusion of the "maintenance" language. 
A second difficulty with the Labor Department's interpreta- 
tion of multiple-employer plans results from its apparent policy 
against third-party administrators. The Department's position 
that third-party administration arrangements are only a funding 
vehicle is at cross purposes with the congressional objective of 
increasing the availability of cost-efficient employee benefit plans 
to small employers. For example, the General Accounting Office 
reports that ERISA was a major factor in the decision to termi- 
nate in the case of about forty-one percent of the employee benefit 
plans with fewer than 100 participants that terminated between 
mid-1975 and mid-1977.g4 The desire to eliminate or reduce high 
administrative costs was cited as the most predominate ERISA 
factor that affected decisions to terminate. The Department's 
exclusion of third-party administrators in effect eliminates the 
most economical method for small employers to distribute their 
administrative costs among a larger pool of participants. Thus, 
by excluding entrepreneurial schemes from federal regulation and 
placing them under the more stringent regulation of state insur- 
ance departments, the Labor Department, in large measure, 
would destroy the incentives behind the very administrative and 
financial arrangement that makes adoption of cost-viable MET 
plans attractive to small employers.VI'he Labor Department 
should carefully evaluate the ramifications of its latest position 
before fully implementing it. 
In any event, the Department's earlier support for state regu- 
lation of bogus employee organization MET's that is now being 
extended to include state regulation of alleged bogus employer 
association uninsured MET's implicitly denotes a more accomo- 
dating view by federal officials toward state insurance depart- 
ments? Although this is by no means an indefensible position, 
94. See [I9791 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 236, at A-13 (Apr. 23, 1979). 
95. It should be acknolwedged, on the other hand, that the establishment of a third- 
party administrator arrangement does not necessarily guarantee cost efficiency. As has 
been seen in cases such as Bell, entrepreneurial schemes also present enticing opportuni- 
ties for abuse and exploitation if effective controls are not employed. 
96. The Labor Department would probably dispute any suggestion that it is accomo- 
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it ne~ert~heless could be argued that the Department has reversed 
its earlier stance and abdicated a portion of its congressionally 
mandated position of total preemption. 
In summarv. although it is impossible to predict the outcome 
of IPRT (II)  and its resulting impact upon the whole field of 
uninsured MET's, it is hoped that the court will seize this oppor- 
tunity to squarely confront the issues and reach a definitive deter- 
mination. 
V. ALTERNATIVES FOR RESOLVING THE UNINSURED 
MET REGULATORY CONTROVERSY 
In order to resolve the uninsured MET regulatory contro- 
versy, two questions must be answered: (1) Where should the line 
be drawn between state and federal reiulation of uninsured 
MET's, and (2) who should draw the line-the Congress, the 
Labor Department, or the judiciary? 
A. Where to Draw the Line? 
The question of where the line between state and federal 
regulation of uninsured MET's should be drawn can be stated 
more precisely: Should ERISA's definition of employee benefit 
plans be interpreted to encompass more of the field of uninsured 
MET's? Whereas a move to bring more of the field of uninsured 
MET's within the definition of an ERISA employee welfare bene- 
fit plan would strengthen ERISA's preemption provisions, a move 
to define more uninsured MET's as not qualifying as employee 
benefit plans would enlarge the regulatory powers of state insur- 
ance departments? 
Some observers have noted that while it is not at  all clear 
that ERISA's preemption provisions will be clarified or re~ised, '~  
no consensus exists, even among those who favor revision of the 
section 514 language, as to whether the preemptive language 
dating state regulation within the employee benefit field; rather, it would likely point out 
that the "bogus" nature of the alleged "employee organization" or "employer association" 
uninsured MET's confirms the fact that such entities were never properly considered to 
be within the definitional confines of an employee benefit plan. 
97. Four public policy considerations favoring state regulations of uninsured 
multiple-employer welfare trusts (UMEWT's) are: (1) disparity in bargaining power be- 
tween participating employers and the UMEWT's; (2) the soliciting and advertising of 
employee benefit "plans" to the public; (3) the very real potential for UMEWT insolven- 
cies; and (4) the administrative incapacity of the Department of Labor to properly super- 
vise UMEWT activities. See Brummond, supra note 1, a t  713. 
98. Turza & Halloway, supra note 19, a t  212. 
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should be expanded or restricted.'' This lack of agreement sug- 
gests that policy considerations will play an increasingly impor- 
tant role in the final outcome. Two factors argue particularly 
persuasively in favor of total preemption: (1) Congress' intent to 
occupy the field of employee benefit plans, thereby displacing all 
state  regulation^,^^ and (2) the national interest in uniformity 
with respect to interstate plansY" Support for these two factors 
is found in the plain language of section 514.Io2 
Conversely, several factors argue with equal force in behalf 
of greater state participation in the regulation of uninsured 
MET's. First is the existing expertise and enforcement machinery 
of the state insurance departments as compared with that of the 
Labor Department?" Second, there is a national interest in leav- 
ing regulation of insurance matters to the individual states.Io4 The 
third factor is the need for prompt and decisive action in the 
public interest. Finally, the federal government has failed to 
adopt minimum standards for uninsured MET's or to refine 
ERISA definitions. 
R. Who Draws the Line? 
The lack of consensus concerning revision of the language in 
ERISA's preemption provisions explains in part why no one has 
99. Compare ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, at 535 (statement of ERISA 
Industry Committee) (supporting current broad preemptive language) and H.R. REP. 94- 
1785, supra note 7, a t  46-49 (recommending strengthening of broad preemptive language) 
with ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, a t  650 (statement of NAIC by Herbert W. 
Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force) (advocating amendments 
to restrict preemptive language). 
100. See ERISA O 2, 29 U.S.C. 9 1001 (1976) (Congressional declaration of policy); 
H.R. REP. 94-1785, supra note 7, a t  46-49. 
101. See H.R. REP. 94-1785, supra note 7, a t  46-49. See also note 23 supra. 
102. See Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459, 465 (1968) (absent 
persuasive reasons to the contrary, the words of a statute are given their ordinary mean- 
ing). 
103. During 1977 the Labor Department received 1.5 million ERISA reports and 
230,000 inquiries regarding ERISA compliance. Consequently, on the average, every em- 
ployee in the Plans Benefit Security Division of the Labor Department would have had 
to review 2680 ERISA filings and respond to 412 ERISA inquiries. ERISA Oversight 
Hearings, supra note 7, a t  670 (statement of NAIC by Herbert W. Anderson, Chairman 
of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force). NAIC also points out that in the field of 
"welfare" benefits, unlike the field of employee pension benefits, the types of benefits 
offered are quite diverse in nature; therefore, the increased complexity in handling claims 
raises administrative costs. Id. at 669. See also Complaint for Plaintiff a t  2, Insurance & 
Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Marshall, No. CV 7903029 RMT (PX) (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 9, 
1979) (an employee welfare benefit plan administrator allegedly waited for over three 
years for an answer to his status inquiry). 
104. See text accompanying notes 27, 28 supra. 
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taken decisive action to resolve the matter. With respect to unin- 
sured MET's specifically, three groups are in a position to offer a 
remedv: the Congress, the Labor Department, and the judiciary. 
I .  Congress-remedia 1 legislation 
When Congress decided to adopt the joint committee's rec- 
ommendation for a much broader preemption provision than had 
been earlier proposed by either house,lM it anticipated that modi- 
fications and improvements would necessarily follow; hence, pro- 
vision was made for the establishment of a Pension Task Force"'" 
to study the consequences of ERISA's implementation and to 
report its findings back to Congress.lo7 Although the Pension Task 
Force has conducted hearings on the subject, no legislative refine- 
ment affecting uninsured MET's has occurred to date.Iox The 
chances of legislation in the near future appear to be growing 
slimmer.'" The present pessimism stems in part from the chang- 
ing provisions of remedial legislation introduced by two of 
ERISA's original sponsors, Senators Williams and J a ~ i t s . " ~  These 
two influential Senators have twice introduced versions of reme- 
dial legislation-S. 301711' and S. 209,'12 with the latter currently 
pending. Both versions of the proposed legislation would amend 
portions of section 514 to reinforce the federal government's claim 
to full preemption with only limited exceptions.":' The earlier 
105. See note 23 supra. 
106. ERISA Q Q 3021,3022,29 U.S.C. 8 4 1221,1222 (1976) (establishment and duties). 
107. Senator Javits of the Conference Committee explained: 
The conferees-recognizing the dimensions of such a policy-also agreed to 
assign the Congressional Pension Task Force the responsibility of studying and 
evaluating preemption in connection with State authorities and reporting its 
findings to the Congress. If it is determined that the preemption policy devised 
has the effect of precluding essential legislation a t  either the State or Federal 
level, appropriate modifications can be made. 
. 
' 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974). 
108. A number of specific amendments to restrict the preemptive scope of ERISA's 
4 514 language have been offered by NAIC. Important recommended changes affecting 
uninsured MET'S would redefine the terms "employee organization" and "employer." See 
ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, a t  672-76 (statement of NAIC by Herbert W. 
Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force). 
109. See 119791 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 221, a t  A-20 (Jan. 8, 1979). 
110. Senator Harrison Williams is the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare. Senator Jacob Javits is the ranking minority member of the same 
committee. 
111. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S 6592 (daily ed. May 1, 1978). 
112. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
113. The pending legislation, S. 209, would underscore ERISA's broad preemptive 
powers by adding to the end of subsection (b)(2)(B) of 8 514 the following: 
936 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
version, S. 3017, as introduced in the 95th Congress, suggested 
two major refinements concerning uninsured MET'S that have 
particular application here. First, section 201 (b) (1) provided a 
definitional clarification of the term "employee organization."".' 
Second, section 266 authorized the Secretary of Labor to promul- 
gate solvency and reserve standard regulations for uninsured wel- 
fare trusts.11% surprising contrast, S. 209, as introduced, appar- 
ently emasculates one provisionH6 and deletes the other:11i Unless 
changes occur, the probable result will be that Congress, in time, 
will underscore the broad preemptive language of section 514,IiX 
leaving the unwanted task of precise line-drawing to the Labor 
Department or the judiciary. 
2. Labor Department regulation 
The Department of Labor has assumed an increasingly ac- 
tive role in resolving the uninsured MET controversy through the 
use of amicus curiae briefs, press releases, and advisory opin- 
ions.llS Nevertheless, the Department's efforts have fallen far 
A State insurance law which provides that a speciFc benefit or benefits must 
be provided or made available by a contract or polir y of insurance issued to an 
employee benefit plan is a law which relates to an employee benefit plan within 
the meaning of subsection (a) and is not a law which regulates insurance within 
the meaning of subparagraph (A) . . . . 
Id. 4 155. The pending legislation includes exceptions for "State domestic relations law" 
and the "Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Law." Id. 
114. The proposed amendment stated in part: "For purposes of this paragraph, the 
term 'employees' beneficiary association' shall mean an association in which employees 
participate as members and in which eligibility for membership is based on a commonality 
of interest with respect to the members' employment relationships." S. 3017,95th Cong., 
2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S 6592 (daily ed. May 1, 1978). Compare id. with ERISA Over- 
sight Hearings, supra note 7, a t  675 (statement of NAIC by Herbert W. Anderson, Chair- 
man of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force). 
115. S. 3017, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S 6594 (daily ed. May 1, 1978). 
116. S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 131 (1979). 
117. Id. 4 102. 
118. If passed in its present or similar form, S. 209 would have the effect of overruling 
the First Circuit's decision in Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 435 US. 980 (1978). ERISA Improvements Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 209 Before 
the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (opening statement 
of Senator Jacob K. Javits) [hereinafter cited as Improvements Act Hearings, 1979). 
Furthermore, the biH would overrule the holding in Standard Oil v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 
695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), in which the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAWAII REV. STAT. 
§ 4 393-1 to -51 (1976), was preempted. Compare improvements Act Hearings, 1979, supra, 
at  642 (statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye and Hon. Spark Matsunaga, Senators from 
the State of Hawaii) (favoring passage of Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act exception) with 
id. at  1053 (statement of H.P. Kneen, Jr., Director of Employee Benefits for IBM) (oppos- 
ing passage of Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act exception). 
119. See, e.g., Letter from Ian D. Lanoff, Labor Department Administrator, to Ed- 
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short of concretely defining a valid ERISA-covered employee wel- 
fare benefit plan. The Department does not presently contem- 
plate issuing any official regulations regarding uninsured 
MET'sI2" despite a resolution from one stateI2' urging such a for- 
mulation. Whether the reason for the Department's reticence be 
caution to ensure the development of foolproof regulations, defer- 
ence to Congress' anticipated remedial legislation, an election to 
attack the problem on a case-by-case basis, or simply indecision, 
the Department's inaction has created a number of serious prob- 
lems. For instance, it has caused a rift between the Labor Depart- 
ment and state insurance departments that have been forced to 
expend substantial time and money in 1itigati0n.l~~ This apparent 
schism in governmental regulation of uninsured MET'S is unfor- 
tunate in view of the fact that the Secretary of Labor is author- 
ized to make "arrangements or agreements for cooperation or 
mutual assistance in the performance of his functions" on a reim- 
bursable or other basis with state departments and agencies, such 
as state insurance departments.lZ3 Congress granted the Secretary 
this  authorization for the  express purpose of avoiding 
"unnecessary expense and duplication of functions among Gov- 
ernment agencies."i24 In addition, the Department's inaction has 
produced a cloud of uncertainty over uninsured MET administra- 
tors and organizers who are genuinely attempting to bring their 
operations into conformity with ERISA's provisions. 
3. Judicial determination 
Although several federal courts have justifiably expressed 
the view that  the resolution of ERISA-related controversies 
should be handled by Congress rather than by the c0urts,~*5t now 
appears that  a judicial determination of the uninsured MET 
ward N. Getoor, President, Multiple Fund Administrators, Inc. (June 29,1979), reprinted 
in 119791 PENS.  REP. (BNA) No. 250, a t  R-28, 29 (Jul. 30, 1979). 
120. Telephone interview with Wayland B. Coe, Acting Assistant Administrator for 
Reporting and Plan Standards, Pension and Welfare Benefits Program, Dep't of Labor 
(Nov. 15, 1979). 
121. Improvements Act Hearings, 1979, supra note 118, a t  1314 (California Joint 
Resolution No. 43). See [I9781 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 199, at A-18 (July 31, 1978). 
122. ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, a t  660 (statement of NAIC by Herbert 
W. Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force). 
123. ERISA 6 506, 29 U.S.C. 6 1136 (1976). 
124. Id. 
125. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 
980 (1978); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 571 F.2d 
502 (9th Cir. 1977). cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978). 
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question is both desirable and necessary. Until a consensus is 
achieved in Congress, some protection must be afforded to the 
public against abuses in the uninsured MET field. 
In anticipation of the judicial determination to come, several 
factors indicate that the courts may be inclined to increase the 
state's regulatory role over uninsured MET's. First is the emerg- 
ing conservative disposition of the Burger Court to allow the ac- 
comodation of state regulation that does not conflict with or im- 
pinge upon federal reg~1ation. l~~ Second, the Labor Department 
has apparently deferred to state insurance departments in the 
regulation of "bogus employer association" uninsured MET's. 
Third, there is a vital public interest in sealing off any regulatory 
void that might cause injury to the working public. Fourth is the 
recognition that if Congress is opposed to a constriction on abso- 
lute preemption, remedial legislation can rectify the situation. 
Although a judicial determination to permit increased state 
regulatory power over uninsured MET's may provide short term 
relief, any move in that direction will necessarily require further 
judicial entanglement in the complex line-drawing controversy. 
Perhaps the more prudent approach for the courts to pursue is 
that  advocated by the plaintiff in IPBT (II). The plaintiff re- 
quested a court mandate directing the Labor Department to rec- 
ognize IPBT as a valid employee benefit plan under ERISA. 
Since the Labor Department is charged with the supervision of 
ERISA plans generally and possesses the power to promulgate 
definitive regulations, the court may be well-advised to order the 
Department to assume regulatory jurisdiction over IPBT and 
other uninsured MET'S-a duty arguably mandated by the plain 
wording of ERISA's preemption provisions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Recent events have again called into question the jurisdic- 
tional bounds between state insurance departments and federal 
regulators in the field of uninsured MET's. The judicial consen- 
sus that emerged from Ham berlin and Bell, permitting state reg- 
ulation of certain plans, may be of limited application because of 
the unusual fact settings involved. The principal question now 
pending before the courts is whether an alleged employee benefit 
plan's definitional qualification under ERISA provisions or the 
126. See generally Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U .  ILL. 
L.F. 515; Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the 
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975). 
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plan's substantive nature should be controlling in determining a 
plan's ERISA status. The difficulty of the line-drawing procedure 
is compounded because of Congress' and the Labor Department's 
failure to act affirmatively and decisively in resolving the matter. 
Clearly, primary responsibility to clarify ERISA's preemption 
provisions rests upon Congress-the originator of the legislation. 
Nevertheless, given the weight of the competing policy is- 
sues-none of which is apparently capable of commanding a con- 
gressional majority a t  present-it does not reasonably appear 
that remedial legislation can be expected in the immediate fu- 
ture. 
Although the congressional stalemate is perhaps understand- 
able, the Labor Department's minimal efforts are inexcusable. 
The Labor Department received a direct congressional mandate 
to implement and administer ERISA. That mandate included the 
power to promulgate official regulations as the need arises. Yet 
despite the magnitude of the existing problem and the pervasive 
uncertainty regarding regulatory jurisdiction over uninsured 
MET'S, the Labor Department continues to refrain from promul- 
gating regulations. 
Because of both the Labor Department's reluctance to act 
and the Congress' division over preemption questions, the judici- 
ary by default has inherited the unenviable task of providing an 
interim solution. Although the courts in the past have engaged in 
the uninsured MET line-drawing controversy, and may elect to 
continue to do so now, the better approach would be for the 
judiciary to place the responsibility where it belongs: on the Con- 
gress and the Labor Department. The courts are powerless to 
compel Congress to act in this situation; the same is not true, 
however, with regard to the Labor Department. The courts should 
exercise their powers of mandate to order the Labor Department 
to recognize under ERISA those parties in litigation that qualify 
as valid ERISA employee benefit plans. Perhaps this judicial 
leverage will induce the Labor Department to promulgate needed 
regulations or stimulate Congress to consider and enact sorely 
needed remedial legislation. 
John A. Adams 
